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Abstract 
 The research in this paper seeks to analyze the rhetoric surrounding issues 
of American foreign policy using the Iran Deal as a case study. The main question 
this research intends to answer is: Are suggested soft power policy solutions, such 
as that of the Iran Deal, characterized as either feminine or masculine? I seek to 
answer this question through a discourse analysis of the rhetoric in newspaper 
articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post about the Iran Deal 
from the year 2015. I identify common themes and phrases among these articles 
and draw my own conclusions about their frequency and relationship. Ultimately, 
I find that soft power policy solutions are characterized through the use of both 
feminine and masculine language depending on whether or not the owner of the 
rhetoric is supportive or unsupportive of the policy. This research begs the 
question of whether or not feminine language is used to render a soft power policy 
solution as inherently less legitimate than hard power policy solutions. 
Implications regarding soft power policies, women and heterosexual men in the 
field of foreign policy, and the difference in value given to masculinity and 
femininity will be discussed.  
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Introduction 
In 2016, 42 percent of voting-age Americans stated that the nation was 
becoming “too soft and feminine,” (Beinart 2016). In that same year, we saw the 
first nomination of a female candidate by a major party for President of the United 
States. Those who responded they “completely agree” that America is becoming 
“too soft and feminine,” were four times as likely to respond that they had a “very 
unfavorable” view of Hillary Clinton compared to those who chose that they 
“completely disagree” (Beinart 2016). Current research tells us that female 
leaders are “less likely” to be perceived as legitimate in their positions than their 
male peers, and that “subordination to women” is the number one type of 
emasculation men fear the most (Beinart 2016). As Secretary of State, Clinton 
began working on the Iran nuclear deal in 2011 (Landler 2016). Her role in the 
deal was what she characterized as, ““set[ting] the table” for Mr. [John] Kerry’s,” 
ultimate diplomatic success (Landler 2016). Clinton’s role in the creation of the 
deal is nuanced, though. She worked closely along side other members of the 
United Nations to pressure Iran into engaging with the negotiations, something 
that led to the continued existence of the agreement (Landler 2016). However, as 
a rather hawkish politician, Secretary Clinton did not come out of the gate fully 
supporting the Iran deal, nor did she completely agree with the path that President 
Obama and then-Senator John Kerry were pushing (Landler 2016). She didn’t 
trust Iran and, though she created a diplomatic team throughout a long negotiation 
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process and expected to implement the plan with full force, Secretary Clinton 
really saw the deal as a way to catch Iran in a fatal blunder (Landler 2016). 
Clinton consistently emphasized the importance of enforcement, setting her apart 
from President Obama’s response to the nuclear deal in its final stages.  
The Iran nuclear deal has become a defining debate of American foreign 
policy. Ultimately, the goal of the agreement is to decrease Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities in exchange for the lifting of international economic sanctions. The 
agreement has stripped Iran of almost all of its enriched uranium and has given 
significant power to the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct 
inspections at a much higher frequency (Szubin 2017). Critics of the agreement 
believe that it will have no effect on the nuclear capabilities of Iran. They see the 
deal as having no mechanism for proper accountability—that just the threat of the 
replacement of economic sanctions will not be enough for Iran to actually stop 
constructing a nuclear armament. Many critics are concerned that Iran will not 
only be able to continue its nuclear program without the knowledge of the U.S. or 
the IAEA, but also that increased economic stability will only give the state more 
regional power and prompt Iran to give increased funding to terrorist 
organizations (Szubin 2017). Though it will be discussed in greater detail later in 
the paper, this is where we see language characterizing the deal as “volatile,” 
“dependent,” and “powerless.” Supporters of the deal largely see the agreement as 
a better alternative to the use of total military force, even though many agree that 
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the deal is not perfect. Some supporters believe that the agreement should not 
have an end date, should cover a wider range of weapons, and should give more 
power to inspection agencies (Davenport 2018). The rhetoric seen coming from 
those who support the deal does recognize the agreement’s potentially flawed 
nature, but they also characterize the agreement as “responsible” and “civilized.” 
The deal has been hotly contested in Congress, and continues to be a source of 
major debate even though the IAEA has reported that, to-date, Iran has been 
compliant with the guidelines of the agreement (Davenport 2018). 
Hillary Clinton’s relationship with the Iran nuclear deal is an interesting 
introduction to the rhetoric surrounding the agreement. The language we use 
matters. If our politicians and journalists are using language associated with 
femininity to purposefully delegitimize an action of foreign policy that doesn’t 
involve hard power—a concept that will be discussed shortly—then their words 
are having an effect on the women in our society whether they intend for them to 
or not. Though the academic community has accepted that femininity and 
masculinity do not correlate directly to femaleness and maleness, to the average 
person, femininity does equal femaleness. Thus, the continued use of feminine 
language to signify inferiority only further solidifies the assumption that women 
themselves are inferior to men, especially within the field of foreign policy. 
American foreign policy has a masculinity problem. The ideology of 
masculinity is so engrained into the culture of our political system that anything 
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that does not align with the language of strength and dominance is seen as 
illegitimate. This limits our foreign policy options at the outset because certain 
options are already mobilized off of the agenda, while aggressive and military 
solutions are given prominence. This can be seen in the preeminence of military 
service as a prerequisite for foreign policy expertise (Enloe 2005). Moreover, the 
language we use to discuss foreign policy reflects this view. We almost 
exclusively view foreign policy and national security through a masculine lens, in 
which the United States must come out as the dominant player above all others. 
Dominance places an emphasis on physical power and supremacy, and more 
specifically involves the emasculation of others (Coe et al. 2007). Emasculation is 
a significant concept, particularly in the discussion of the rhetoric of foreign 
policy. The U.S.’s emasculation of their political adversaries not only involves the 
stripping of traditionally masculine qualities, such as courage and nobility, but it 
also involves attributing to them typically feminine qualities, such as weakness or 
lack of emotional control (Coe et al. 2007). It is not just that the United States 
seeks to be the most dominant player in any political relationship, but that the 
U.S. seeks to be the most masculine.  
 Carol Cohn (1993) argues, “…gender discourse informs and shapes 
nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and 
absences…it degrades our ability to think well and fully about nuclear weapons 
and national security, and shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our 
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deliberations,” (emphasis not my own). My project intentionally takes up these 
silences and absences to explore how American foreign policy is shaped and 
limited. The findings of this research add to a growing interest in issues of gender 
in American foreign policy, and aims to add nuance to this wider body of 
literature. It also hopes to spark a greater conversation about the gendered 
hierarchy of values I’ve traced here and about how those in the discipline can 
work to change it. The American affinity to the use of aggression and the ease 
with which our foreign policy makers gravitate towards it as the most sensible 
solution to a conflict keeps diplomatic responses on the backburner; this 
occurrence is demonstrated by the language with which policy solutions are 
discussed. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the language that is being used, 
and to discuss what the discourse of American foreign policy is currently 
ignoring. 
 Foreign policy solutions are typically categorized in two different 
classifications: hard power and soft power (Nye 1990). Without even defining 
what hard and soft power actually are, it is easy to discern that hard power 
includes the use of the military while soft power involves diplomacy; hard power 
is to the Department of Defense as soft power is to the State Department (Nye 
1990). The reason most people, regardless of their level of knowledge regarding 
foreign policy, would be able to match hard power to the military and soft power 
to diplomacy is because the words “hard” and “soft” are descriptive rhetoric that 
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create images in our heads. Hard and soft power have been socially constructed to 
convey a specific meaning. Social construction occurs when a particular meaning 
is attached to a concept as a result of preconceived notions held by general 
society; further, these attached meanings create and solidify a reality that their 
subject then exists in (Doty 1993). Though this paper will delve even deeper into 
the details of masculine and feminine language later on, this is a meaningful 
introductory discussion. The word “hard” is associated with strength—strong 
substances such as steel, concrete, and muscle are all hard—and thus so is the 
military. The word “soft,” however, is associated with weakness—feeble 
materials such as cotton and foam are soft—and thus so is diplomacy. When we 
categorize words into a gender discourse, the word “hard” falls under masculine 
and the word “soft” falls under feminine. We have socially constructed the reality 
of hard and soft power, but more importantly we have socially constructed a 
gendered reality that these two concepts live in.  
The concept of social construction will continue to play an important role 
throughout this paper. Using gendered descriptive language to brand the Iran deal 
is by definition the social construction of the Iran deal. Because soft power, hard 
power, masculinity, and femininity bring along with them their own realities, the 
Iran deal assimilates to these realities when this is the language used to discuss it. 
The Iran deal is an intangible, gender neutral subject so it can be neither hard nor 
soft and neither masculine nor feminine, but because the gendered language of 
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hard and soft foreign policy is used to discuss it, it comes to be defined by a 
mixture of these descriptors. The stance that a politician or journalist took on the 
deal impacted the reality they attempted to create for it. If the speaker did not 
support the Iran deal, it came to exist within a framework of feminine language. 
Potentially more interestingly, if the speaker did support the agreement, it was 
branded almost exclusively via masculine language.  
Throughout the history of American foreign policy, our military defense 
program has been celebrated and over funded, while the State Department has 
consistently fought for its place in the federal government. It is inarguable that 
hard power—the use or threat of force—has been exalted far above soft power in 
American foreign policy. Historically, we can see one example of this preference 
for military power through the way negotiations were characterized as a policy of 
appeasement during the interwar period. Even the use of the term itself—
appeasement as opposed to negotiations—placed a stronger emphasis on the 
concessions being made than on the goal of reaching peace without violence, 
conjuring a more negative connotation of the policy. Realist scholars and political 
actors posited appeasement policy as an aversion to an inevitable showing of 
military force that was undoubtedly needed to stop Italy and Germany, and was 
specifically described as naïve, corrupt, and cowardly (Ripsman and Levy 2008; 
Ashworth 2002). Appeasement policy, a soft power policy solution, was 
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denigrated in contrast to the use of the military, even during the aftermath of a 
war coined “The War to end All Wars.”  
Scholars have been studying the relationship between foreign policy and 
masculinity for some time, but the research specifically regarding femininity is 
lacking. The work these scholars have completed has already established that 
masculine rhetoric is used in the discussion of foreign policy to display strength 
and power (Coe et al. 2007; Cohn 1993; Dean 1998; Enloe 2005; Ferguson 2007; 
Tickner 1992); in this paper I seek to determine whether or not feminine rhetoric 
is used to describe policies that do not fit the masculinized institution of American 
foreign policy.	  Previous work has focused largely on the impact of masculine 
rhetoric in foreign policy to legitimize particularly aggressive foreign policy 
options which typically encompass hard power, but there has been less attention 
paid to how less aggressive foreign policy solutions of soft power are feminized. 
Both this analysis and previous research show possible implications regarding 
whether or not the use of feminine language renders soft power policy solutions 
as less legitimate. In this vein, the key contribution of my project is to examine 
the rhetoric surrounding the discussion of a specific foreign policy that centralized 
the ideas of diplomacy and negotiation, and to analyze the gendered dimensions 
of media coverage of this policy option. In order to do this, I perform a discourse 
analysis of the Iran Deal during the year of 2015. I observe the rhetoric used by 
those discussing the Iran Deal (typically political pundits, journalists, and 
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politicians) and use these observations to further discuss the gendered 
implications of the language chosen. I pursue one main research question 
throughout the discourse analysis and discussion thereafter. Are soft power policy 
solutions, such as the Iran Deal, gendered feminine through the rhetoric that is 
used to discuss them? Furthermore, I find that supporters of a policy solution that 
is typically feminized use masculine language as a counter.  
It is important to note that the goal of this research is not to implicate 
specific foreign policy actors as anti-woman. Furthermore, I also do not 
particularly intend to say that there is a conscious effort by politicians and 
journalists to equate femaleness with inferiority. As will be discussed later on, 
femininity and masculinity are not the same thing as femaleness and maleness. 
What I do intend to argue is that the words our society has come to recognize as 
masculine—strong, powerful, diligent, trustworthy—are given more credence; 
while the words our society has come to recognize as feminine—soft, dependent, 
compromise, thoughtful—are codified as “less than” those that convey 
masculinity. In her 1988 response to Morgenthau’s six principles of political 
realism, Ann Tickner seeks to uncover why international politics is perceived as 
“a man’s world,” and why women are so underrepresented within the active and 
the academic fields. Before she asks this question, Tickner (1988) states, “Nuclear 
strategy, with its vocabulary of power, threat, force, and deterrence, has a 
distinctly masculine ring; moreover, women are stereotypically judged to be 
	   12 
lacking in qualities which these terms evoke.” I quote Tickner in this instance to 
show that the questions she and I are posing are not unrelated, but they are still 
different questions.   
Throughout the rest of this project I will show that soft power policy is 
inherently related to femininity. The remainder of my thesis proceeds as follows. 
First, I layout my theoretical framework through a discussion of masculinity and 
femininity and the relationship between gender and American foreign policy. 
Then I discuss my findings from the discourse analysis of the Iran Deal and use 
my theoretical framework to show how these concepts are interconnected. Finally, 
in my conclusion I gesture to larger questions that arise from my findings. 
Ultimately, I find that not only is soft power rhetorically categorized as feminine, 
but also that supporters of soft power policy almost exclusively use masculine 
language. I question whether or not this masculine rhetoric is used to legitimize a 
soft power policy solution as viable and effective. The distinction between these 
two types of language—feminine language to delegitimize, masculine language to 
legitimize—is important to make because it shows that there is an active 
understanding of feminine descriptive language as evoking a sense of inferiority.  
Contextualizing the Question 
There is a long history between the concepts of gender and American 
foreign policy, so the questions I ask here are not unprecedented. In order to give 
context to my research questions, I divide my theoretical framework into two 
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categories. First is a discussion of masculinity and femininity; what these terms 
mean, how they are related, and the common rhetoric prescribed to both. This 
discussion allows me to structure and build my theory concerning the rhetoric of 
foreign policy, as I find that masculinity and femininity are evoked through 
language that is vastly different. I also find that femininity is relegated to a 
discourse of weakness and vulnerability, while masculinity encompasses anything 
that is strong and powerful. The distinction between this rhetoric is a continuation 
of the differences between hard and soft power that have previously been 
introduced. A discussion about the relationship between American foreign policy 
and gender follows. This discussion in particular gives historical context to the 
part of my theory that relies on masculinity already being established as 
prominent in American foreign policy. The standard discourse of American 
foreign policy is gendered masculine, and this shapes the way society perceives 
the best policies to implement and the best leaders for the field. The literature 
shows that language gendered masculine has long been used in American foreign 
policy to convey a message of strength, dominance, and power in the realm of 
international politics in foreign affairs. I intend to use this literature to frame the 
questions I am asking and to structure the theoretical discussion that will follow.  
Masculinity and Femininity  
A tale as old as time; the connotations of the words masculinity and 
femininity have been forming from the dawn of society. In today’s rhetorical 
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world, masculinity denotes what is “manly,” while femininity conveys the image 
of what is considered “womanly,” or rather, whatever the opposite of “manly” is 
(Paechter 2006). It is, however, incredibly hard to define what exactly is and is 
not “manly,” (Paechter 2006; Connell 1995). One interesting aspect of 
masculinity is that it is socially perceived to be something that is earned, whereas 
femininity is something one is born with (Gilmore 1990, 1); women are born 
while men are made. A person, typically a male, “becomes” masculine through a 
process that involves heterosexual sexual conquests and excellence in challenging 
situations (Gilmore 1990, 1). More importantly, because masculinity is something 
that can and must be earned by males, women are completely excluded from the 
narrative. This means that femininity and masculinity are seen as two, mutually 
exclusive, separate binaries in competition with one another; it leads us to 
perceive that a person—or policy—exhibiting feminine qualities cannot possibly 
also exhibit masculine qualities. Until the mid-to late 20th century, academics and 
psychologists largely believed that masculinity and femininity were two polar 
opposites, and that people could be described as either one or the other (Hoffman 
2001). Over time, the academic community has come to accept that masculinity 
and femininity exist on a scale, or a spectrum, on which people and characteristics 
fall (Hoffman 2001). Still, socially and rhetorically we polarize masculinity and 
femininity. The socially constructed connotations of what it means to be either 
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masculine or feminine have affected the language and rhetoric we use on a daily 
basis.  
 This concept of social construction continues to be important in the 
context of how politicians and journalists discuss the Iran deal because of the 
understood meanings that follow masculinity and femininity. We perceive 
masculinity and femininity in a certain way because of the societal definitions that 
we’ve given to them. The term masculinity is ultimately derived from the Latin 
diminutive “mas,” meaning “male person” (Online Etymology Dictionary). As 
language evolved, masculinity did not simply become the adjective of mere 
maleness, it became the word used to describe “having the appropriate qualities 
of the male sex,” (Online Etymology Dictionary, emphasis my own). These 
appropriate qualities include strong and powerful, aggressive, brave, competent 
and intelligent, independent, assertive, confident, and the ability to dominate, to 
use logic, and to reason (Cohn 1993; Dean 1998; Echabe 2010; Fagenson 1990; 
Pacholok 2009; Tickner 1992; Drew 2004). Admittedly, it is difficult to discern 
which came first: powerful men who pushed the idea of what a man should or 
should not be, or society’s construction of such a man?  
 Men who portray only the ideals of masculinity have historically been 
rewarded with success in their pursuit of power in American society. The fervor 
with which our society has held on to this idea of what men should act like has led 
to what has been coined hegemonic masculinity. Because the men in power 
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portray characteristics like strength and dominance, we associate these terms with 
what “real” men should act like. Over time, the United States military has used 
this idea of hegemonic masculinity to draw on who they most want to be the 
members of the armed forces. The military has consistently portrayed its ideal 
candidate as an able-bodied male who is both heterosexual and cisgender, 
someone they can build into a strong, dominant, patriotic man (Locke 2013). Thus 
military masculinity and hegemonic masculinity have become virtually 
synonymous with one another, creating a problem when we seek to create soft 
power policy solutions—characterized as feminine—in opposition to military 
solutions. We also know of course that the terms listed above do not define the 
characteristics of all men; or in other words, not all men fit into one classification 
of masculinity (Paechter 2006; Hoffman 2001; Lansky 2001). Hegemonic 
masculinity in practice devalues not only women, but also men who do not fit into 
the idealized version of masculinity. “Masculine gender role training is probably 
more rigid than its feminine equivalent…men are confined to a much narrower 
range of acceptable gender performances,” (Lansky 2001) and we can see 
examples of how this plays out in our society fairly easily. Conservatives heavily 
ridiculed President Obama, questioned his authenticity, and called him “pathetic” 
and “weak” after he shed tears when discussing the 2012 Sandy Hook School 
Shooting (Bobic 2016; Lussenhop 2016). Homosexual men have been 
systematically discriminated against throughout the history of the military 
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(Sinclair 2009). Up until President Clinton’s 1993 policy of Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell, homosexual men were strictly banned from the United States military, a 
policy that presumed that homosexuality inherently rendered someone not 
masculine enough—or rather, too feminine—to be capable of serving in the 
military (Sinclair 2009). Even the DADT policy assumes that homosexuality, 
once known of, has a negative effect on an organization structured on idealized 
masculinity (Sinclair 2009).  
 In the same way there are specific characteristics that we associate with 
masculinity, femininity can be defined by our social construction as well. The 
words that evoke these characteristics include pleasant, modest, helpless, 
dependent, emotional, cooperative, naïve, kind, selfless, serving, affectionate, 
understanding, and empathetic (Wilkie 2012; Takacs 2005; Cohn 1993; Tickner 
1992; Fagenson 1990; Echabe 2010). Even though research widely accepts that 
masculinity and femininity are on a spectrum, society dictates that femininity is 
anything that is the opposite of masculinity. What is most important about the 
relationship between masculinity and femininity and the rhetoric with which we 
elicit their imagery, is the value we place on masculinity above femininity. In 
Gendering War Talk, Carol Cohn (1993, 229) argues 
“…human characteristics are dichotomized, divided into pairs of polar 
opposites that are supposedly mutually exclusive: mind is opposed to 
body; culture to nature; thought to feeling; logic to intuition; objectivity to 
subjectivity; aggression to passivity; confrontation to accommodation; 
abstraction to particularity; public to private; political to personal, ad 
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nauseam. In each case, the first term of the “opposites” is associated with 
male, the second with female. And in each case, our society values the 
first over the second.”  
 
The idea that these characteristics are mutually exclusive to one another is the 
foundation of the problem. When a person begins to exhibit one of these traits, the 
rest of society automatically positions them on the spectrum of masculinity and 
femininity (Cohn 1993). We force people—and policy—into boxes and place 
value on the categorization we’ve given them. So if a woman uses emotion, she is 
automatically characterized as feminine and is excluded from being able to own 
any of the traits we associate with masculinity, and because we inherently 
perceive feminine qualities as less valuable than masculine qualities, this creates a 
problem for women seeking positions of power. We can see now that using 
certain words as descriptors lead to how we categorize a subject subconsciously; 
and more specifically, we can see how it impacts the social construction of the 
Iran deal. When a male politician posits that his female opponent is “kind-
hearted” and “well-meaning,” we associate her with feminized language, and even 
though he never said that she was “dependent” or “naïve” we assume that she is 
anyway. In the same way, when the Iran nuclear deal is characterized as 
“vulnerable” or “weak,” it is automatically precluded from being “responsible” or 
“smart,” because these descriptors exist on opposite sides of the gender spectrum. 
  I seek to use the concepts of masculinity and femininity to uncover the 
ways in which soft power policy solutions are constructed through the institution 
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of gendered rhetoric that foreign policy exists within. The contradictions that 
masculine and feminine language bring to life when used to build the rhetoric 
surrounding foreign policy solutions serve to characterize such policies as either 
valuable or invaluable. The feminine descriptive language discussed above is the 
specific type of descriptive rhetoric that I search for in my discourse analysis of 
the Iran deal. The Iran deal is consistently characterized as feminine because it is 
soft power and thus it is inherently feminized in nature, especially when it is in 
direct opposition to hard power solutions that involve military power, which owns 
an archetype of strength and dominance.   
American Foreign Policy and Gender 
In general, there is a difference in the way that foreign policy overall is 
gendered in comparison to domestic policy. Foreign policy, because of its 
relationship to war, power, conflict, and security and to the language that 
inherently follows these concepts, is gendered masculine (Tickner 1988). 
Domestic issues, such as health care and education policy, are typically gendered 
feminine because they are associated with characteristics such as nurturing 
(Tickner 1988). The public—policies that affect the greater good, i.e. foreign 
policy—is in opposition to the private—policies that impact citizens more in their 
daily lives, i.e. domestic policy. This perception of foreign policy as innately 
masculine and domestic policy as feminine means that female voices are 
considered unimportant and unreliable (Tickner 1992). This gendering of the two 
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types of policy is why it’s been easier for women to enter into the overall field of 
public policy work through feminized positions than through masculinized 
positions. Currently, there is one woman on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, but ten women on the Committee on Education and the Workforce. It 
is important to recognize the way that our perceptions of public policy can have 
an effect on the people that we accept as worthy of playing a role in our foreign 
affairs. 
After the 2002 midterm elections, Bill Clinton famously said, “When 
people are feeling insecure, they’d rather have someone who is strong and wrong 
than someone who’s weak and right,” (Goldstein 2003). The Bush 
administration’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was littered with language 
about strength, dominance, and aggression in the face of a challenge (Christensen 
2008; Coe et al. 2007; Drew 2004; Ferguson 2007; Goldstein 2003; Takacs 2005). 
The Republican party did well in the midterm elections following the 9/11 attack 
because their rhetoric expressed what Richard Goldstein (2003) called 
“patriarchal values of strength and order,” while the Democratic party talked 
about empathy, equity, conciliation, and peace talks—all words that trigger a 
feminine image in the minds of their constituents.  
 The strategic use of gendered language by the Bush administration didn’t 
just refer to statements about dominating the Middle East and fighting back 
against terrorism. The language used by President Bush signified that America in 
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its current state was vulnerable; the United States needed to use military might—a 
masculine entity due to its inherent aggressive nature—to “defend its honor,” to 
protect the weakest among us—women and children—and become survivors of 
our tragic victimization (Drew 2004; Christensen 2008). The United States was 
painted as a feminine entity, one that was clearly weak and susceptible to 
violation, and the only solution was to begin projecting strength and hard power, 
that is to become more masculine (Drew 2004). There was no mistake in the way 
the Bush administration chose to characterize the United States. The mixture of 
feminine and masculine language to create the image of the United States military 
as the knight in shining armor swooping in on a white horse to save the damsel in 
distress—which became U.S. citizens, Western ideals of democracy and freedom, 
and women and children in the Middle East wrapped up in one—helped to 
legitimize the War on Terror.  
 George W. Bush was certainly not the first president to promote the idea 
of a masculine America. The rhetoric surrounding American foreign policy has 
always taken on a tone of dominance and aggression (Dean 1998; Enloe 2005). 
The conversation about American foreign policy and gender is much deeper than 
just the rhetoric used by politicians and journalists on TV and in the newspapers, 
because foreign policy becomes more than intangible language. Historically, 
policies of aggression involving military force have been, and continue to be, 
perceived as more viable options than those of diplomacy involving negotiations 
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(Cohn 1993). The concepts of hegemonic masculinity and mutual exclusivity 
discussed previously allow us to draw important conclusions about why 
aggressive policies are more legitimate than peaceful ones. Dominant males who 
personify the ideals of the true “manly man” are the people who have controlled 
American foreign policy since it existed, and the few women who have cracked 
into this glass encased field, such as Condoleezza Rice, Madeleine Albright, and 
Hillary Clinton, have been attributed many of the qualities identified as 
masculine.  
In his 1998 article titled “Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and 
the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy,” author Robert Dean stated, “Internalized 
ideals of manliness influenced the way leaders perceived threats posed by foreign 
powers. Fear of the consequences of being judged “unmanly” influenced the 
reckoning of political costs or benefits associated with possible responses to those 
threats.” The relative success of the United States is often credited to our style of 
foreign policy, and because that foreign policy has traditionally been saturated 
with a masculine dogma, any policies associated with soft power and femininity 
are delegitimized (Goldstein 2003; Tickner 1992; Cohn 1993). 
 This inherent delegitimization of soft power policy solutions limits the 
scope with which American foreign policy can respond to the multitude of 
challenges that face our political leaders on a daily basis. Shortly following World 
War II, Albert Einstein notoriously stated, “You cannot simultaneously prevent 
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and prepare for war.” What Einstein was alluding to was the concept of nuclear 
deterrence and the building up of arsenals of biological and nuclear weapons. 
Einstein’s statement characterizes what I argue throughout this thesis, whereas, 
more generally, he was alluding to the threat of force—which is the use of hard 
power—in order to prevent another war. There exists a dichotomy between soft 
and hard power—one cannot exist in the same instance as another; and 
furthermore, because hard power has historically been accepted as the most 
logical way to respond to foreign adversaries—clearly Einstein’s warning meant 
little to both the United States and Russia—soft power policy solutions are 
systematically overlooked as even potential choices. In some ways there was 
actually hypocrisy among the feminized rhetoric used to describe the Iran Deal; it 
was cast as both “dangerous” and “ineffective.” Regardless, those who opposed 
the deal were baffled that it was even being considered as a viable solution in the 
first place, and that mindset exists because of the reality of illegitimacy that soft 
power lives in. 
Research Design & Methodology 
As the previous sections alluded to, themes of masculinity and femininity 
are pervasive in American foreign policy. We can see them in the existence of 
particular stories that are told about what policies are viable, and the language 
used to critique these policies. In “W” Stands for Women, author Michaele L. 
Ferguson (2007, 13) states, “Rhetoric is never merely rhetoric, it constructs a 
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particular (if incomplete) world view that enables us to see certain connections, 
yet occludes others. Like a picture frame, the rhetorical framing of political issues 
shapes and contextualizes the perspective of the audience.” Perception is reality, 
and rhetoric is undeniably used to influence the way that abstract concepts such as 
foreign policy become reified. Discourse, as it is essentially the action of nuanced 
communication, is constantly changing. Thus, the importance of tracking 
discourse over time is unquestionable.  
This thesis has two main components: the empirical and the theoretical. 
The empirical evidence—found through a discourse analysis of the Iran Deal, 
discussed below, and a contextual discussion of masculinity, femininity, and the 
relationship between gender and American foreign policy—is used to shape the 
theoretical discussion of the legitimacy granted to the Iran Deal. It is important to 
note that this style of research intrinsically links the research completed to the 
researcher. Discourse analysis is a unique style of research in that it is based on 
observation and theory building, both of which are subjective and interpretative in 
nature. This study in particular is loosely influenced by Roxanne Doty’s 1993 
discourse analysis of the U.S.’ counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines. 
 Doty (1993) uses what she calls the “Discursive Practices Approach,” to 
study the “linguistic composition of reality” in regards to U.S.-Philippines policy. 
I use this approach because I am interested in uncovering the underlying 
meanings and implications of the discourses on a particular American foreign 
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policy. While Doty (1993) also points out the connection between the researcher 
and the research due to the interpretative nature, she explains the validity and 
reliability well. Doty (1993) analyzes rhetoric by looking for distinctions in the 
presupposition, predication, and subject positioning of the subjects and objects 
related to her topic of choice. At its most fundamental level, discourse analysis is 
about identifying a subject, examining the language used to describe and discuss 
that subject, and then explaining the meaning given to that subject through its 
description. Meaningful discourse in and of itself is not always easily identified, 
and discourse analysis in practice can be ambiguous because of the multitude of 
meanings one type of discourse can take on at any point in time. Discourse 
analysis allows us to identify the ways in which our language is built upon a 
system of hierarchies and preconceived notions that impact our understanding of 
any given topic. Through my discourse analysis of the Iran Deal I seek to 
investigate the identity created for this specific soft power foreign policy solution 
through the rhetoric used to discuss the agreement. In my conclusion, I use the 
competing gendered characterizations of the Iran deal by critics and supporters to 
argue that this structure of language impacts the way that the Iran deal, and other 
soft power solutions thereafter, is perceived and thought about. I argue that the 
different language used to discuss the Iran deal is not simply arbitrary, but 
actually constructs multiple realties within which the Iran deal exists depending 
on the type of language that is used.  
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The main reason that Doty’s 1993 discourse analysis in particular 
influenced this research is because she emphasizes that the empirical analysis of 
rhetoric is not interpreted subjectively by the researcher. The interpretive nature 
of her discourse analysis lies in how she explains what the existence of that 
rhetoric means. This aspect in particular is what separates a discourse analysis 
from a content analysis. Like Roxanne Doty, this research does not merely state 
the existence of certain content. Instead, this research pushes one step further. 
Through my interpretation, I theorize what the implications are of the existence of 
feminine and masculine language in the rhetoric used by those discussing the Iran 
Deal, and how that language codified the Iran Deal depending on which way a 
speaker gendered the agreement. Specifically, I discuss how the rhetoric 
surrounding the Iran Deal shaped the understanding of the legitimacy of the deal 
as an action of foreign policy.  
The discourse analysis portion of this research is based on articles from 
The New York Times and The Washington Post from January through December 
of 2015. This range of dates was chosen for two reasons. First, there were several 
major developments regarding the Iran Deal made throughout the year of 2015. 
Second, the Google Trends data shows that the largest spikes in searches for the 
Iran Deal all happened between March 24, 2015 and September 12, 2015. The 
initial spike correlates with the announcement of a letter sent by Republican 
lawmakers in Congress to political leaders in Iran threatening the likelihood of the 
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deal’s failure without U.S. congressional support which President Obama 
slammed as unconstitutional (Davenport 2018). This range of trends also includes 
the official announcement of an agreed upon deal, the support of the deal through 
a UN resolution, and the sending of this deal to Congress by President Obama 
(Davenport 2018). This trend data led me to believe that not only was the policy 
more prominent in media publications at this time, but also that more people were 
coming into contact with the rhetoric being used to discuss it. Thus, because I 
seek to argue that gendered discourse constructed the reality in which the Iran 
deal was perceived by those who participated in and bought into such discourse, I 
decided that the year of 2015 would be the most effective year from which to 
draw my empirical evidence.  
In any situation of foreign policy, the main creators of the discourse being 
used are the politicians implementing or arguing against a policy, and the 
journalists commentating on their process. In this media analysis, I chose to use 
articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post because both 
publications are prominent political watchdogs of the United States government 
with significant reader bases, and neither is known for being substantially biased 
towards either end of the political spectrum (Glader 2017). I chose which articles 
specifically to analyze through a random sample. I found through the LexisNexis 
database that there were 467 total articles in The New York Times and The 
Washington Post—258 from the Times and 218 from the Post—that mentioned the 
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Iran Deal from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015. I inputted this range of 
numbers (1-467) into Excel to rearrange them into a randomized list, and then 
analyzed the articles in the order generated by Excel. I did not have a specific 
number of articles that I expected to read, but rather I decided I would continue 
reading articles until I felt like I wasn’t receiving any new empirical evidence 
from my analysis. 
Keeping in mind the Discursive Practices Approach outlined by Roxanne 
Doty (1993), I evaluated each article for descriptive language that painted the Iran 
Deal as either masculine or feminine. Because we know that both explicit and 
implicit rhetoric have an effect on the reality that language creates, I categorized 
my observations in these two separate categories. I used the descriptors that were 
repeated most commonly when discussing the Iran deal to structure my discussion 
of the reality this rhetoric creates. These are words used by politicians—domestic 
and international, as well as authors from The New York Times and The 
Washington Post. Notably, most of the people present in the discussions of the 
Iran Deal are men. Though the use of feminine and masculine rhetoric is not 
dependent upon the maleness or femaleness of the person speaking, it is 
interesting that the most prominent actors and commentators of the Deal were 
men. The Iran deal specifically was chosen because this policy solution 
encompassed multilateral negotiations and diplomacy—two of the main signifiers 
of soft power. The deal was also heavily debated and I expected there to be an 
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effort from those who did not support it to characterize the policy in an 
unfavorable light. In addition, the Iran Deal—as opposed to other issues I 
considered, such as responses to the Syrian Refugee crisis and the debate 
regarding the competition for funding between the State Department and the 
Department of Defense—has transcended academic and humanitarian discourse; 
the agreement has steadily been apart of household public discourse as well. 
Throughout the recent presidential election, a candidate’s position on the Iran deal 
was a frequent topic, whereas the Syrian Refugee crisis and the funding debate 
were less common. I thought that it was important to choose a debate that was 
prominent in both the professional and public aspects of foreign policy because of 
the emphasis I place on the ability rhetoric has to impact widespread perception.  
The descriptors observed were used in all different aspects of the Iran 
Deal. They were present in discussions regarding the writing of the policy, the 
development of negotiations, the implementation process, and the potential 
outcomes of the proposed policy. Additionally, this rhetoric was also used 
concerning the individuals involved in the establishment of the policy, namely 
members of the Obama administration. In the case that a descriptor was only used 
to describe President Obama himself or his administration, but was not used to 
describe the Iran Deal, it has been italicized in the tables below.  
Findings 
	   30 
 As previously stated, this section of my analysis is grounded in empirical 
evidence. I observed the language used to discuss the Iran Deal by identifying 
adjectives, adverbs, and characteristics prescribed to the deal. The methodology 
with which I studied each article is similar to the “predication” methodology of 
Roxanne Doty (1993). The articles used in this media analysis are listed in the 
Appendix in the order by which I analyzed them.  
 There are two existing tables that organize my findings; the information in 
these tables is categorized in three different ways. Table 1 organizes the explicit 
language used, while Table 2 organizes the implicit language. Then, these 
descriptors are categorized as either for or against and as either feminine or 
masculine. By for or against I do not simply mean whether the language was 
positive or negative, but rather whether the owner of the language was supportive 
or unsupportive of the Iran Deal. This style of presentation was chosen so as to 
best juxtapose the sheer amount of masculine rhetoric used in the discourse 
supporting foreign policy in comparison to the amount of feminine rhetoric used 
by those who oppose the policy. These differences seem to be particularly stark 
when the prevailing discourse is effectively a debate about whether or not a 
certain policy should be implemented. 
 The explicit language, presented in Table 1, is not surprising. These 
descriptors were taken from phrases such as, “an imperfect deal,” “a smarter, 
more responsible way to protect,” “strong and disciplined diplomacy,” 
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“vulnerabilities of the deal,” and “worrisome implications.” These are direct 
phrases that politicians used when discussing the Iran Deal in public settings 
(such as on the House and Senate floors, in press conferences, and in television 
interviews) or were stated directly to journalists, and were then reported in one of 
the two media outlets. In some cases, such as with the phrase “Iran…[is] rubbing 
Obama’s face in the weakness of his enforcement position,” (emphasis my own) 
the language is used not by a politician, but instead directly by the author of the 
article. As can be seen, there is a significant difference in the type of language 
that those who supported the Iran Deal chose to use in comparison to the type of 
language used by those who did not support the agreement.  
Table 1: Explicit Descriptors 
 For Against 
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Valuable (1) 




[Exemplifies] leadership (2) 
 
This difference can also be seen in the implicit language, presented in 
Table 2, that was used. These descriptors were taken from phrases such as, “to 
signal readiness and restore a credible military option,” “providing a pyromaniac 
with matches,” “does not inspire confidence,” “instead of chest-beating,” “better 
than nothing,” “spur a nuclear arms race,” “increases the chances of war,” 
“disloyal to the U.S.,” and “will sustain the military options in case it becomes 
necessary.” 
Table 2: Implicit Descriptors 
 For Against 









[Inspires feelings of] doubt, fear, 
hesitation (13) 
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Far-reaching (2) 
 
The rhetoric listed in these tables has also been elementarily quantified. 
The parenthetical numbers next to each descriptor signify the number of times 
that descriptor appeared in the discourse analysis process. Initially, I was 
concerned that the limited number of explicit descriptors found would be limiting 
in my research. Because this is a random sample taken, it can be inferred that 
similar descriptors would be found throughout the articles that were not analyzed. 
Additionally, a significant amount of the descriptors come quotes of different 
speakers, and many of the explicit descriptors illicit similar connotations and 
implications. For instance, “vulnerable” and “worrisome,” though not the same 
word, bring forward similar feelings of inferiority and uncertainty. This shows 
that, though many of the explicit descriptors were only found once throughout the 
analysis, there was a widespread use of feminine language by critics and 
masculine language by supporters. 
These numbers show an interesting disparity in the commonality of 
implicit and explicit language. In the discourse analysis, much of the explicit 
descriptors were seen only once or twice, while many of the implicit descriptors 
were seen more often. Though this is not relevant to the discussion of masculinity 
and femininity in foreign policy, this observation draws interesting questions 
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about the way that politicians discuss policies when addressing the public. 
Additionally, Table 1 and Table 2 show a notable difference in the amount of 
masculine and feminine language used depending on whether the person speaking 
was a supporter or not. Supporters of the Iran deal used a very minimal amount of 
feminine language when discussing why they were supporting the agreement; 
while those who did not support the Iran deal only used feminine language. No 
masculine language was explicitly used to show disagreement with the deal, and 
in general we wouldn’t expect to hear someone—neither a supporter nor 
dissenter—say that any action of foreign policy should be considered “too strong” 
or “too powerful.” This observation is supported by the previous discussion of 
foreign policy being generally characterized in a masculine manner. Because the 
default characteristics within foreign policy are masculine, it stands to reason that 
masculine language is used as long as the policy is supported, and that feminine 
language is only used to argue against a policy.   
My main goal in completing this research is to answer one question: Are 
specific policy solutions—for example, the Iran Deal—characterized as feminine 
or masculine? Due to the existing research that shows that foreign policy is almost 
entirely discussed through a masculine lens, I presupposed that the answer to my 
question would be that a soft power solution such as the Iran Deal would be 
characterized as feminine. Tables 1 and 2 provide evidence of my own that this is 
true. There is an overwhelming amount of feminine language used by those who 
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opposed the Iran Deal—as stated previously, these individuals did not use any 
masculine language to argue against the Iran Deal.  
The findings of this discourse analysis also show that masculine language 
was used in direct opposition to feminine language. The tables provide further 
evidence that the rhetoric used in the discourse of foreign policy is gendered. 
Based on the observation that those who did not support the Iran deal used 
exclusively feminine language to describe it, and that the supporters of the Iran 
deal used almost entirely masculine language leads to the conclusion that 
masculine qualities are fundamentally more valuable in this realm of policy than 
feminine language. Supporters of the Iran Deal specifically chose to leave out 
descriptors such as “peaceful,” or “compromising,” or “nonviolent” because, even 
though the agreement was all of those things, these are not characteristics that 
make policymakers, journalists, or the public feel confident in a policy. Instead 
supporters focused solely on the typical rhetoric of foreign policy used to describe 
hard power policy solutions like “strength” and “security.” Even when President 
Obama praised the agreement for not being a symbol of “chest-beating,” he paired 
this phrase with words like “smart” and “responsible,” so that instead of this 
seeming like a criticism of masculinity, it became a criticism of barbarism; he 
painted a picture of the conqueror versus the conquered, a civilized, strategic 
diplomat versus an unintelligent caveman. Even in criticizing toxic masculinity, 
President Obama still managed to portray an image of a more advanced, 
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sophisticated type of masculinity—one that still very much held the power and 
control in the U.S.-Iran relationship.  
Though there are many interesting items of discussion regarding the 
language I observed to be the most commonly used to describe the Iran Deal, 
there are three items which I believe are most important when considering the 
descriptive rhetoric surrounding it. The emphasis placed on the deal’s dependent 
nature, the implication of mere mediocrity, and the use of masculine rhetoric by 
the supporters of the deal are the three predominant themes that I identified.  
Emphasis on Dependence  
One of the most common themes in the language used by the opposition 
was that of dependence. Explicitly and implicitly, those opposed to the Iran Deal 
claimed that it was dependent on Iran, dependent on compliance, and dependent 
on military backup. The supporters of the Iran deal also reinforced the deal as a 
multilateral operation, which has interesting connotations in and of itself. The 
idea of dependence alone brings with it ideas of weakness, naïveté, and inability.  
 There are separate meanings between the Iran Deal being dependent on 
Iran and being dependent on Iran’s compliance. At the very least, there are 
separate connotations. In an article written for the Washington Post, journalist 
Dennis Ross (Appendix A, Item 24) said that the success of the Iran Deal 
“depends heavily on Iranians allowing access to inspect sites.” The identification 
of another state becoming dominant over the United States is incredibly 
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detrimental to the image of a foreign policy solution among policymakers. This 
specification of the Iran Deal being dependent on not just something outside of 
the written agreement itself, but on another foreign entity, i.e. Iran, in particular 
signifies a complete lack of control owned by the United States. As discussed 
previously, the United States places an incredible amount of effort into being the 
most dominant, and therefore the most masculine, state in any foreign 
relationship. Dominance evokes other descriptive words such as assertive, 
effective, powerful, and, above all, complete control of the situation; all things 
that are the opposite of dependence. Dominance is a key aspect of idealized 
masculinity as it directly includes being aggressive and risk-taking, and striving 
for power and success (Pacholok 2009).  
 Dependence on compliance, though it essentially has the same meaning 
when taken out of context, has a slightly different undertone. Senator Rand Paul 
said that the deal is “dependent on compliance,” suggesting that the deal is only 
legitimate if it works. In order to see how this implication relates to the ideas of 
masculinity and femininity we will have to dig a little deeper. Recall earlier in this 
paper when I discussed the relationship between femininity and femaleness. 
Though femininity and femaleness are not directly correlated, the language of 
femininity is often assumed to apply to women, and, vice versa, the characteristics 
and experiences of women are assumed to be distinctly feminine. Particularly in 
the field of foreign policy, women, if allowed a chance, are then expected to 
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prove themselves. They are only accepted as viable players once they prove that 
their policies work. Men, on the other hand, are assumed to be innately good at 
navigating the realm of international relations. When Senator Rand Paul stated 
that the Iran Deal was “dependent on compliance,” he was implying that the deal 
would have to prove its worth, that time would tell whether or not the agreement 
was viable—in the same way a woman would have to as the Secretary of State. 
What’s most interesting about this is not that it is fundamentally wrong to want a 
policy or a person to prove their worth through their outcomes, but rather that 
only feminine entities—be it policies or people—are expected to. Masculine 
entities, however, have failed time and time again. Aggressive actions do not 
always fix the problems they set out to fix, often they even make them worse, and 
masculine leaders, because they are human, have made countless numbers of 
mistakes. Still, these masculine units are assumed to be the most natural and 
effective options.  
 The reinforcement of the Iran deal as a multilateral operation has a similar 
effect in terms of drawing themes of femininity. The idea of being multilateral in 
and of itself is not a bad thing—it means the U.S. was following international 
protocol and respecting other states with interests in the region. Multilateral 
operations can also be considered a form of protection from retaliation of 
aggrieved states (Ikenberry 2003). Still, there is an underlying implication of 
dependence on other nations that follows multilateralism. It also brings with it 
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connotations of compromise and shared power and leadership responsibility. 
These are all concepts that fall under the category of feminized rhetoric, and serve 
to place multilateralism into this category as well. The idea of a policy being 
managed by the United States as dependent on the buy in and political authority 
of other states and entities such as the European Union and United Nations served 
to secure the soft policy solution of the Iran deal as an inherently feminine action.  
 The emphasis placed upon dependence on military action is perhaps the 
most obviously feminine rhetoric available within the larger theme of dependence 
in general. General Martin E. Dempsey, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff at the time of the implementation of the Iran Deal, said that the agreement 
[was] “better than launching a military strike, but I will sustain the military 
options in case it becomes necessary.” President Obama attempted to mollify 
concerns about the deal by assuring that Israel would always have military 
superiority over their neighbors. Senator Marco Rubio called for the United States 
to instead gain a stable military position in the Middle East “to signal readiness 
and restore a credible military option.” The King of Saudi Arabia was unhappy 
with the United State’s approach to Iran, and negotiated a $1 billion arms 
agreement with the Pentagon to provide weapons for the Saudi Arabian war effort 
and bolster Saudi forces in order to reassure those with concerns about the 
shortcomings of the Iran Deal. Saudi Arabia was noted as becoming “increasingly 
assertive,” signifying that states who choose to use weapons are assertive, while 
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those who choose not to use weapons are the opposite: passive, meek, compliant. 
The previous discussion of hegemonic masculinity, idealized masculinity, and 
military masculinity all being relatively synonymous make the relationship 
between the rhetoric of dependence on the military and lack of masculinity quite 
palpable. The assertion that the Iran Deal would not be sufficient on its own 
accord from both the support and the dissent implies that the deal is feminine in 
nature, and is a strong indication that this form of foreign policy is not seen as 
entirely legitimate because of that implication.  
 “Weakness is always considered a danger when issues of national security 
are at stake,” states Tickner (1992, emphasis my own). The frequent portrayal of 
the Iran Deal as dependent in any form did more than just link the deal to ideas of 
weakness because it was also consistently paired with phrases that codified the 
deal as dangerous. This is significant because it further allowed the option of 
using military force to seem like the safe alternative, even though the use of 
military troops puts the livelihood of American soldiers in direct risk. Classifying 
the Iran Deal as a dangerous, unstable, or volatile policy solution that could only 
be made credible through the use of a hard power solution created a dichotomy in 
which the feminized Iran Deal existed in direct opposition to the masculinized 
military. This hierarchy inherently places hard power solutions above soft power 
solutions, and therefore allowed the Iran Deal to be depicted as a less legitimate 
response than the use of military force.  
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Implication of Mediocrity & Lack of Confidence  
Even though they are considered synonyms, there is a slight difference 
between the words “adequate” and “mediocre,” and that difference leaves one 
characterized as masculine and the other as feminine. When we decide something 
is adequate, we think of phrases such as, “This will work.” When something is 
defined as mediocre, however, the phrase that comes to mind is, “We can find 
something better.” Adjectives such as “imperfect” and “flawed” were used both 
by those who supported and those who did not support the deal, but the tone with 
which they were used is what signaled a difference between adequacy and 
mediocrity. Both supporters, Senator Blumenthal said that the agreement was 
“imperfect, [but] the best path forward,” and Senator Peters said that the deal “fell 
short [but that] …alternatives [were] more dangerous.” Over 100 former 
American ambassadors came together to defend the agreement, saying that it was 
“comprehensive and rigorously negotiated,” and that though it was “not a perfect 
or risk-free settlement…without it the risks would be far greater.” Both of these 
statements imply that the deal itself would do, it wasn’t perfect, but it was 
acceptable.  
 Mediocrity more so than adequacy was implied across the aisle. There was 
significant emphasis placed on the “doubts,” “fears,” and “skepticism” 
surrounding the deal. President Obama and his administration pushed the 
agreement as an ultimatum. He said, “No deal means a greater chance of more 
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war in the Middle East,” and that the choice being made was “between diplomacy 
and some sort of war.” The opposition used similar language to that used by the 
supporters when saying that the deal was imperfect and flawed, but then followed 
up by saying that they were in favor of “tougher” and “more ironclad” deals—
specifically deals that included the use of the United States military. President 
Obama’s language made the Iran Deal something that was standing directly in the 
middle of stability and chaos. The ultimatum he gave policymakers signified that 
it didn’t matter if there was a better deal to be had, this was the one that had been 
negotiated and it was the one they would be moving forward with. The language 
he used was the equivalent of a parent giving in to their toddler whining about 
how something “just isn’t fair.” In this metaphor, Obama-as-parent says to 
Congress-as-whining-toddler, “You’re right, it isn’t fair, but you’re just going to 
have to deal with it.” Adequacy is something we seek, while mediocrity is 
something we seek to overcome.  
 Similar to the discussion of the emphasis placed on the agreement’s 
dependence on compliance, the rhetoric of adequacy and mediocrity is gendered 
through our understanding of how femininity and masculinity relate to femaleness 
and maleness. Women are consistently held to different workplace standards than 
men, and it is well documented that women receive less workplace promotions 
than men. Often this is attributed to women’s personalities; hypocritical standards 
exist for women in positions of superiority in which they cannot be too strong or 
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too soft or too mean or too nice or too loud or too quiet or too or too or too. When 
it comes time for promotions, men are almost always assumed to be adequate for 
the position, and if they are excellent candidates that is just an extra bonus. 
Women, on the other hand, are presumed to have certain personality qualities that 
they have to overcome, evoking a sense of mediocrity and less confidence, 
meaning that women often have to prove not only adequacy but true excellence in 
order to be chosen for a promotion. Similarly, those opposed to the Iran Deal 
emphasized a sense of mediocrity at best—signifying that there absolutely was 
something better out there, specifically something more closely aligned with a 
hard power solution. 
Use of Masculine Language by Supporters  
Those who supported the Iran deal almost exclusively used masculine 
rhetoric when discussing the agreement in public settings. Phrases such as 
“increase of regional security,” “America will be safer and stronger,” and “strong 
and disciplined diplomacy,” were common. Some supporters stated that those 
who chose not to support the agreement were “treasonous” and “disloyal to the 
U.S.,” implying that support for the deal was patriotic and loyal—both masculine 
terms. Though this theme in the rhetoric is not directly related to the use of 
feminine language, I think that the implications are just as strong. In order to 
attempt to legitimize and increase support for a diplomacy deal, a type of soft 
power associated with femininity, supporters were careful to use the same type of 
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language that would be used to discuss military action. They assured those who 
were uncertain about the deal that the Iran Deal negotiations would bring strength, 
stability, and security.  
 The rhetoric with which supporters framed the Iran Deal is significant 
because it is purposefully lacking of language that included words such as 
“peace,” “compromise,” and “nonviolent.” Though peace and the absence of 
violence are typically the goal of any foreign policy—wars are waged in the name 
of stopping violent injustice—the use of these words were not used because 
supporters knew that they would not create the reality that those with concerns 
wanted to hear. The Obama Administration’s Iran deal was fighting an uphill 
battle, and policymakers across the aisle wanted to know what the benefits of this 
deal would truly be. Even the type of masculine rhetoric President Obama 
employed was strategic. In order to make the Iran Deal agreement seem like the 
most viable option available, he simultaneously condemned brute force and 
lauded a sophisticated, civilized function of power. Obama was quoting as saying 
that instead of “chest-beating,” it should be accepted that “strong and disciplined 
diplomacy is the best way.” There was a conscious effort here to reinforce that 
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The observations I have made lead me to more nuanced findings than I 
originally expected to arrive upon. I did expect to find the discussion of the Iran 
deal to be largely characterized as feminine in nature. However, the 
overwhelming use of masculine language by supporters of the Iran deal was not 
something I expected to observe in this context. At the outset, I believed that I 
would see two different types of feminine language being used; supporters using 
positive feminine language such as “compromise,” and dissenters using language 
similar to what was seen—negative ideas such as “vulnerable.” The dichotomy 
that exists between the use of feminine and masculine language—feminine 
language to express a negative view and masculine language used to express a 
positive view—has incredible implications on what the use of feminine language 
does to any form of foreign policy. Previous research on masculinity and 
femininity shows us that masculine characteristics are inherently more valued in 
our society, and as such the feminine characterization of the Iran deal served to 
render it less legitimate than a more masculine policy. The empirical evidence of 
this study allows us to infer that feminine rhetoric is used to characterize policy 
solutions as an illegitimate act of foreign policy. Though I originally expected to 
be able to draw this conclusion in relevance to only soft power solutions, I 
wonder if this is truly the case. There should be further research done on the 
gendered rhetoric surrounding foreign policy solutions. The findings of this 
research raise an important question about whether or not feminine rhetoric is 
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used to negate any action of foreign policy as a viable option. Furthermore, is 
masculine language used intentionally to make feminized policy solutions seem 
more legitimate and effective?  
This research is not without limitations. First, it is entirely possible that 
my sole analysis of newspaper articles contributed to the type of rhetoric that I 
found discussing the Iran deal. By limiting my analysis to exclude television news 
media, I may have also neglected rhetoric that was actually intended to reach a 
wider public audience. As television news media is typically more politically 
biased than print news, it would be interesting to extend this analysis to 
discussions of the Iran deal within television news media to see if there is a 
difference in the type of rhetoric used to characterize the agreement. The use of 
only print news media may have also contributed to the lack of explicit 
descriptors found. In each article, there was often only one quote that could be 
considered as intending to characterize the Iran deal. In many of the articles, 
unless they were opinion based pieces, journalists refrained from making any of 
their own comments about the intrinsic nature of the deal. This lack of biased 
descriptive language from journalists meant that most of the rhetoric was coming 
from politicians, and only searching for this rhetoric in print news media limited 
the volume available for analysis.  
The difference between print news media and television news media 
implicates a different audience as well. Television news media is directed more 
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towards the general public looking to receive as much news as possible as quickly 
as possible. Print news media is typically more detailed and discusses current 
events in a much more educational manner. The rhetoric used in television news 
media is specifically directed towards an uninformed public, while print news 
media takes quotes from direct interviews, written statements, political hearings, 
or premeditated public addresses. The audience of print news media is a more 
informed public are often taken from a situation directly related to the policy 
being discussed, which means that the rhetoric being used seeks to delegitimize a 
policy solution for a completely different audience. In the case of this analysis, 
the rhetoric sought to delegitimize the Iran deal for political actors on the other 
side of the aisle from the speaker. The language found here shows supporters 
seeking to change the minds of dissenters and vice versa. If further research was 
to be done regarding the rhetoric used in television news media, the audience 
would shift and so would the rhetoric.  
Furthermore, the Iran deal was an incredibly politicized agreement, and 
thus the discussion largely tended to be black and white. Though supporters of the 
deal accepted and stated that the agreement had its flaws, they stayed consistent in 
their use of language that characterized the deal as the most reasonable option. On 
the contrary, those who did not support the deal did not waiver from their 
characterization of the deal as a dangerous policy that would not do what it was 
intended to do. Furthermore, the time frame with which I analyzed the rhetoric of 
	   48 
the Iran deal was in the middle of an extremely politicized relationship between 
Republicans and Democrats, and between Congress and the Executive branch. I 
believe it is possible that the extreme politicization of the deal led to the polarized 
nature of the rhetoric that surrounded this debate. Similar research should be done 
to analyze the rhetoric of soft power policy solutions that are not so politicized to 
find if there is a similar pattern in the use of feminine and masculine rhetoric. 
In the case of the Iran deal, feminine language was used by those who did 
not agree with the policy as a worthwhile solution, while masculine language was 
used by those who did. In order to prove that this characterization had an impact 
on the perception of the Iran deal as legitimate or illegitimate, more research 
would need to be done in regards to public perception of the specific descriptors 
used to discuss the policy. It would also be interesting to apply this theory to other 
instances of soft power policy solutions. One such policy debate that would 
produce interesting detail to this discussion is the War on Terror. There has been a 
major emphasis throughout multiple presidential administrations that the United 
States government does not and will not ever negotiate with terrorists, but we 
consistently interact with state entities that have committed atrocities against their 
citizens more horrific than the average terrorist attack. While the approach to 
terrorism is riddled with grey areas, it is interesting to consider how our 
preconceived notions and innate acceptance of hard power policy solutions may 
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inhibit us from considering how any sort of soft power solution may be better 
suited to reaching the goals of the War on Terror.  
Currently, there is a noteworthy discussion happening regarding the 
United States approach to our relationship with North Korea. The Trump 
administration has maintained simultaneous uses of hard and soft power in 
response to North Korea; threatening military attacks while also verbally 
supporting the existence of a diplomatic relationship between President Trump 
and Kim Jong Un. A discourse analysis of President Trump’s proposed policy 
solutions in general would surely yield interesting insights, but this policy in 
particular has been a highlight of his since he began his presidential campaign. 
President Trump has relied on the use of masculine imagery of dominance from 
the very beginning, so I believe we would find similar findings in that the rhetoric 
surrounding a diplomatic relationship with North Korea would probably be 
characterized by masculine terms. Furthermore, it would be interesting to analyze 
the way in which Republicans and Democrats have changed their rhetorical 
framing of the debate between the use of hard or soft power policy solutions from 
the Obama administration to the Trump administration.  
The implications of these findings are far-reaching within the field of 
foreign policy, and beg much larger questions. If soft power solutions are 
delegitimized through feminine rhetoric what does this mean for individuals who 
are not perceived to own the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, such as 
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women and heterosexual men, seeking positions in foreign policy? Liberals and 
typically Democrats, are more likely to be proponents of soft power solutions than 
of hard power solutions, what does the delegitimization of soft power solutions do 
to the credibility of Democrats in the field of foreign policy? To what extent does 
the public’s perception of the value implicit to masculinity and femininity shape 
the discourse within which policy solutions are discussed? How important is it 
that soft power policy solutions are at the very least perceived as legitimate in 
order for them to be effective? Is there any truth to the characterization of soft 
power policy solutions as less legitimate than hard power policy solutions? 
Perhaps the most important question that this research begs is one of change. 
How, with such an intrinsic relationship to masculinity, can the field of foreign 
policy separate itself from the gendered bias it is currently steeped in? 
Furthermore, do we actually want this bias to change?  
As stated previously throughout this research, rhetoric is incredibly 
important. It creates the reality that we exist within, and dictates how we perceive 
everything around us. The findings of this research have important implications 
on the perception of femininity on a greater scale within American society. We 
place a significant amount of responsibility and status on the state, and thus the 
state’s affairs. If the actions of the state continue to be inherently biased against 
femininity, then progress to correct the value disparity between masculinity and 
femininity will eventually plateau. Furthermore, as our social construction of 
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masculinity and femininity causes us to prescribe the characteristics of each to 
men and women respectively, then this biased rhetoric will only continue to 
uphold the notion that women are inferior to men in the realm of public matters, 
including the field of American foreign policy. 
The gendered bias that exists within American foreign policy is hindering 
our ability to curate flexible, multifaceted policies that are easily personalized to 
different solutions. I hope that as more women begin to enter the field of foreign 
policy, feminine qualities such as empathy, the propensity to listen, and 
compassion begin to be more valued in our policymaking strategies. That being 
said, the women who have progressed the closest to surpassing the ultimate glass 
ceiling in American foreign policy have all been somewhat hawkish in their 
foreign policy, which further goes to show that femininity and femaleness are not 
truly synonymous. Ultimately, regardless of gender, foreign policy actors have to 
be more cognizant of their preconceived notions of legitimate foreign policy 
solutions and have to start asking themselves why those preconceived notions 
exist in the first place. It will take the self-awareness of all those involved in the 
discourse of foreign policy to recognize how their gender biased language affects 
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Appendix: 
Articles Observed in Discourse Analysis (listed in order of observation) 
1.   Rudoren, Jodi. 2015. “Netanyahu Appoints Right-Wing Politician as 
Israeli Ambassador to U.N.” The New York Times 
2.   Gladstone, Rick and Jodi Rudoren. 2015. “Benjamin Netanyahu, at U.N., 
Continues to Condemn Iran Nuclear Deal.” The New York Times 
3.   Erdbrink, Thomas. 2015. “Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Urges ‘Careful 
Scrutiny’ of Iran Deal.” The New York Times 
4.   Shear, Michael D. 2015. “Jonathan Pollard, Spy for Israel, to Be Released 
on Parole.” The New York Times 
5.   Harris, Gardiner. 2015. “Obama’s Quiet Vacation Will Yield to a Noisy 
September.” The New York Times 
6.   Mackey, Robert. 2015. “Complete Video of Obama’s Case for the Iran 
Deal.” The New York Times 
7.   Birnbaum, Michael and Carol Morello. 2015. “No breakthroughs as Kerry, 
Putin meet in Sochi.” The Washington Post 
8.   Roth, Andrew. 2015. “Russian official denies reports of Iranian general’s 
secret visit.” The Washington Post 
9.   Weiner, Rachel. 2015. “Democratic Sen. Ben Cardin says he will vote 
against the Iran deal.” The Washington Post 
10.  No Byline. 2015. “The Iran deal’s credibility.” The Washington Post 
11.  Shear, Michael D. 2015. “In Speech to Veterans, Obama Says Iran Deal Is 
‘Smarter’ Path to Take.” The New York Times 
12.  Weisman, Jonathan and Alesander Burns. 2015. “Iran Deal Opens a 
Vitriolic Divide Among American Jews.” The New York Times 
13.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2015. “Former U.S. Diplomats Praise Iran Deal.” 
The New York Times 
14.  Kristof, Nicholas. 2015. “Mr. Obama, Try These Arguments for Your Iran 
Deal.” The New York Times 
15.  No Byline. 2015. “The Iran deal hurts U.S. allies.” The Washington Post 
16.  DeBonis, Mike. 2015. “Obama may not need veto pen to save Iran deal.” 
The Washington Post 
17.  Kamen, Al and Colby Itkowitz. 2015. “The real winners in the Iran deal: 
The lawyers.” The Washington Post 
18.  Tumulty, Karen and Paul Kane. 2015. “Clinton making a sales pitch for 
the agreement.” The Washington Post 
19.  DeYong, Karen. 2015. “Joint Chiefs chairman offers ‘pragmatic’ nod to 
Iran deal.” The Washington Post 
20.  Rucker, Philip and Robert Costa. 2015. “Ohio senator tries to dodge 
Trump’s shrapnel.” The Washington Post 
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21.  Editorial Copy. 2015. “what are the Iran deal alternatives?” The 
Washington Post 
22.  Editorial Copy. 2015. “Too desperate for an Iran deal.” The Washington 
Post 
23.  Rudoren, Jodi. 2015. “Netanyahu May Turn Iran Defeat to His Favor.” 
The New York Times 
24.  Ross, Dennis. 2015. “Iran deal leaves U.S. with tough questions.” The 
Washington Post 
25.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2015. “White House Turns to Social Media to Sell 
the Iran Deal.” The New York Times 
26.  Morello, Carol. 2015. “Why this Sunday is a significant day for the Iran 
nuclear deal.” The Washington Post 
27.  Harris, Gardiner. 2015. “Biden Trip to Florida Raises Speculation About 
Presidential Run.” The New York Times 
28.  Bird, Kai. 2015. “The Ghosts That Haunt an Iran Accord.” The New York 
Times.  
29.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld and Ashley Parker. 2015. “Ambassador Tries to 
Bridge Gap with U.S., but on Israel’s Terms.” The New York Times 
30.  Gerson, Michael. 2015. “Obama’s bitter endgame on Iran.” The 
Washington Post 
31.  Morello, Carol. 2015. “Key senator says to forget the deadline on Iran 
talks for a better deal.” The Washington Post 
32.  No Byline. 2015. “Today in Politics: A Pledge for Republican 
Togetherness, on Donald Trump’s Terms.” The New York Times 
33.  Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2015. “Pro-Israel Aipac Creates Group to Lobby 
Against the Iran Deal.” The New York Times 
34.  Dowd, Maureen. 2015. “Hi-Ho, Lone Ranger.” The New York Times 
35.  No Byline. 2015. “Today in Politics: Jeb Bush Is Still Waiting for Polling 
to Catch Up With Fund-Raising.” The New York Times 
36.  The Editorial Board. 2015. “Israel and America After the Iran Deal.” The 
New York Times 
37.  No Byline. 2015. “Today in Politics: Democrats Gather for Chicken wings 
in Shadow of Iowa State Fair.” The New York Times 
38.  Weisman, Jonathan and Michael R. Gordon. 2015. “Kerry Defends Iran 
Nuclear Deal Before Skeptical Senate.” The New York Times 
39.  Brooks, David. 2015. “The Marco Rubio-Carly Fiorina Option.” The New 
York Times 
40.  Krguman, Paul. 2015. “R-E-S-P-E-C-T.” The New York Times 
41.  Cooper, Helene and Gardiner Harris. 2015. “An Arms Deal is Aimed at 
Saudis’ Iran Worries.” The New York Times 
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42.  Parker, Ashley and Peter Baker. 2015. “G.O.P. Senator, Bob Corker, Is 
Key Player in Iran Accord.” The New York Times 
43.  Steinhauer, Jennifer and Julie Hirschfeld Davis. 2015. “Irate Democrats 
Denounce G.O.P. on Iran Letter.” The New York Times 
44.  Giacomo, Carol. 2015. “How to Get Smart About Iran.” The New York 
Times 
45.  Marcus, Ruth. 2015. “A break in Congress’s gridlock?” The Washington 
Post 
46.  Fifield, Anna. 2015. “N. Korea expanding its ability to mill uranium, 
analyst says.” The Washington Post 
47.  Johnson, Jenna and Robert Costa. 2015. “In Nev., Trump takes off the 
heavy boxing gloves.” The Washington Post 
48.  Eilperin, Juliet and Steven Mufson. 2015. “Obama calls congressional 
oversight on Iran deal ‘reasonable’.” The Washington Post 
49.  DeBonis, Mike and Katie Zezima. 2015. “At Capitol, a chorus against Iran 
deal.” The Washington Post 
50.  No Byline. 2015. “Sen. Cardin does not represent his constituents on 
Iran.” The Washington Post 
51.  No Byline. 2015. “Accord didn’t open door to nukes.” The Washington 
Post 
52.  Krauthammer, Charles. 2015. “The Iran deal: Anatomy of a disaster.” The 
Washington Post 
53.  Weigel, David. 2015. “At GOP debate, Paul seeks edge as a dove in sea of 
hawks.” The Washington Post 
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